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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECHES OF MATTHEW P.
SCHAEFER AND JAMES P. MCILROY
QUEST[ON, PROFESSOR KING: Is this the type of thing where
suddenly there will be an eruption because some bad thing happened
that the provinces or states did? Is that going to excite people? We
know it is a problem. Everybody agrees it is a problem. But what is
going to bring it to a head?
ANSWER, MR. McILROY: Maybe I can take a quick stab at that.
At their meeting last year, the Canadian Premiers addressed this issue,
and I understand they will be coming forward with some kind of a
paper suggesting how the provinces can become more involved in the
international trade negotiation process, which means they are exploring
that first option that I mentioned.
I do not think the problem is fully being addressed. I think the
provinces seem to be taking a lead on it. I would like to thank Matt for
also pointing out another problem, which was the fact that the Canadian
provinces just did not come forward with any kind of offers on the
GATr procurement code. I think there are a lot of people wondering
why that did not happen. I think the key point is that in Canada we
have two problems: we have the problem of judicial authority, along
with the problem of political authority. You folks in the United States
are dealing with the issue of unanimous consent. You do not need it. In
Canada we are still not sure whether we need unanimous consent. I
think we need a couple more real problems to emerge before this issue
comes to the floor. But, as I say, the Annex I issue was bungled last
year. The latest one is the failure that provinces conform. We have
procurement code offers. So there is a pattern starting to emerge. I
would say within the next two to three years this should be addressed.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: You see this in the linkag-
es area in the environmental community. We saw that the last panel
does not really understand the trade community. I think you also see
that, between state and provincial governments, governors tend to be
more outward-looking. They have been involved in export programs.
They see the political benefits of jobs much more readily than some
other elected and un-elected state officials. And I think it is just going
to take an enhanced awareness on behalf of some of the other state
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officials of just how important this is. I do not know how you go about
doing that. Like I said, it may take a crisis or it may just take time.
QUESTION, MS. LORRAINE EDEN: I am struck by the compari-
son between the ability of Canada and the United States to negotiate
international tax treaties and the problems in international trade treaties.
It seems Canada has both the right and the ability to implement an
international tax. At least there has not been the same problem at the
federal level in terms of establishing bases and rates and withholding
taxes. Yet there is the problem at the trade level. Maybe it is simply
because these things have not gotten into the cross-border area the way
they have at the trade level.
I think about the same thing in the United States. For example,
California faced the worldwide tax in the Barkley's Bank case, where
both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration were really
reluctant to get involved. It seemed to me they were caught because the
U.K. was saying on one side, we are going to withhold benefits to you
under the U.SJU.K. tax treaty, and at the same time they really wanted
to support California's right in this. I wondered if you had given any
thought about the same thing regarding federal/state in terms of the tax
treaty versus trade.
ANSWER, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: Actually the taxation issues
specifically related to the GATS were some of the more controversial in
the Uruguay Round from the state perspective because GATS does not
address most direct taxation. It only addresses indirect sales tax. GATS,
on the other hand, does address direct taxation. So there is some
concern about what GATS means for unitary taxation practices like the
one in California. There is an exception. I believe it is in Article 14 of
the GATS for apportionment formulas. But there was still concern after
reading the exception. And then the chairman of the negotiating group
in GATS created an interpretation in an unofficial document. But, there
was still concern after that.
So what you will find is that the statement of administrative action
states that unitary taxation is okay under the GATS. It is attached to the
U.S. implementing bill that makes the statement of administrative action
the authoritative interpretation of the GATS for purposes of any action
by the federal government against a state to enforce the Uruguay Round
agreement.
So the tax administrators and the tax community were aware that
this might be an end-run because what happens in most U.S. tax treaties
is that sub-federal jurisdictions are exempted from it. The U.KJU.S.
treaty nearly died until there was a reservation put in for the sub-federal
jurisdictions.
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The other thing I would question, in terms of other forums, is the
multilateral investment agreement going on in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Are they going to list
specific reservations and how do they handle sub-federals? Well, it did
not even work out in NAFTA. Are they going to attempt to do the
same thing in the OECD under the Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment (MAI), list specific state and provincial exemptions from the MAI
or are they going to have to grandfather all existing nonconforming
measures without specific identification? The same issue is going to
arise.
COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: You are right about Article 1206 and
Annex I, but I would not make too much of it. It was purely pragmatic.
The problem was that the provinces started listing everything, and a
solution was found that dealt with it pragmatically. I would not read too
much into that.
As for the federal/state issues, under treaty law when a federal state,
absent a federal/state clause, ratifies an international treaty, the state is
bound to it. A question arises with the subunits. Neither of you men-
tioned four important GATT cases: gold coins un-adopted, two pending
provincial liquor board cases, and what you call Beer H1, the U.S. equiv-
alent of the liquor board cases.
In all four cases, the GATT dealt with provincial or state laws, laws
that were inconsistent with GATT. They treated those laws as if the
provinces and the states were bound in every sense as the federal gov-
ernment was bound. In other words, while it was raised in the gold
coins case and in the first provincial marketing boards case, the panel
said we do not care if we are talking about provincial laws or measures,
we are going to construe those laws in the same way we would con-
strue them as if they were passed by a unitary state. So I would argue
that in trade agreements, the issue of state adherence as separate entities
is irrelevant. The fact is that the federal state is bound, and that, in turn,
binds the subunits. At least that is what the four GATT cases tell us.
COMMENT, MR. MceLROY: We talked about this earlier. You try
to get your pianos into the market and you cannot. You have a right to
retaliate, and at the end of the day you feel pretty good about the retali-
ation, but your pianos still are not being sold.
I think that in a case where a province says to the feds that they are
not changing their law, you can hammer the federal government. Your
client is still in a position where the provincial government can state
they are not bound by what the government of Canada negotiated; the
government of Canada, may be on the hook, but so what?
I think we are going to see something interesting in these Chapter
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11 investment disputes, if they ever go anywhere. If an arbitration panel
says "yes, that is a violation," and the province says, "so what, we are
not paying," Ottawa will have to write a check for an action over which
it is responsible, and over which it has no authority. I think that Ottawa
is going to become reluctant to put itself on the hook. This GAIT pro-
curement code issue is a very good example. That is basically where
you say to the provinces if you want to sign on, sign on. Look at the
environmental agreement. The last time I looked at the NAFTA side
agreement on the environment, do you know how many provinces had
signed on? Alberta and Quebec, two provinces.
I sense that what has already happened with the United States and
with the discussions with the E.U. on GATT procurement is that the
next time we all shuffle to the table and sit down, the E.U. is going to
tell Canada, then maybe they should not be sitting at the table because
everyone is there to talk about subunits, and Canada does not have
much of a track record in delivering their subunits, so maybe they
should sit out this session. I do not think we are there yet, but I do see
a pattern emerging.
I agree with you that it was a good pragmatic solution to the Annex
I problem. I guess what concerns me is that they had two years and an
extra three months, and they still could not deliver the goods. That
worries me. I think there is a systemic problem there. Is it that the
provinces do not want to do it? Is it that the provinces do not have the
horses to do it? I think the states are very good at export promotion, as
are the provinces. That has been their game. But trade policy is a new
game for them. Do they have the horses, and do they have the people
in place? I do not know. Right now I do not think they do.
I am not saying that the sky is falling and that we should all be
running around like Chicken Little. All I am trying to say is that there
has been a shift in the paradigm. I do not think the bureaucracies have
shifted. I do not think that the provinces are equipped to deal with these
problems. And I think at some point the feds are going to get reluctant
to start signing on to these things. I totally agree with you. As far as a
panel is concerned, a provincial law is covered by a treaty. But when
the time comes for retaliation, whom do you hammer? The problem is
that it is going to be Ottawa.
COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: I do not want to prolong this. The
only point I would make is in Beer I, which, I think, is worthy of a de-
tailed study. In Beer I, in the implementation phase, the Province of
Ontario did not fully implement its obligations. The United States retali-
ated and applied quotas on the import of Ontario-brewed beer, not Ca-
nadian-brewed beer. So, they could be quite selective. Ontario, in turn,
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stopped buying Stroh's beer, and they were quite selective, too. The
point is there was a way in which this was worked out because Ontario
products were targeted specifically in the withdrawal of benefit.
COMMENT, MR. McILROY: What would have happened if they
had targeted Quebec beer? I think then you would have had an interest-
ing case.
COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: Yes.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SCHAEFER: In fact, on this issue of
retaliation, often it is difficult to target it for better jurisdiction. The
United States was worried about this and shipping beer through other
provinces, for one thing.
The European Union in the GATT Superfund case thought Lloyd
Bentsen was responsible for an extra tax on imported petroleum, so they
tried to target Texas products. They selected beef and a couple other
things. But it is tough to do in a lot of cases. And the other thing that
might happen is, say, there is a state that is found in violation. You do
not want to target them; you want to target the state from where the
Senate majority leader is so you get the bill introduced.
COMMENT, MR. O'GRADY: I would just make a quick commen-
tary on this Schedule I thing. It seems to me that filling out the sched-
ule and providing the information, which somebody at some point must
have thought was important, is much more connected to the process of
completing the negotiation of the treaty; that is, as they say in British
constitutional cases, in pith and substance. It is much more a function of
the federal power than any power the province might have to imple-
ment. So you would have thought that if the federal government was
prepared to stand up to the provinces, which, of course, we know it is
not, it would have said, look, you are required to do this and we will
either take you to the Federal Court, which they would not do, I guess,
or we will commission a professor or two and do it ourselves. You can
tell us if you disagree, but otherwise we are going to file it. Perhaps the
federal government was not properly fulfilling its role in the scheme of
things.
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COMMENT, MR. McNAB: I do not want to disagree with the
premise that there are problems identified between getting the provinces
and states to agree to or to implement obligations that have been negoti-
ated by the federal government, but I think we might be reading a bit
too much into the case of the provinces not coming forward with gov-
ernment in terms of offers. As I understand it, this was sort of the icing
on the cake, as far as the United States was concerned, to try to get the
large purchasers of a great number of services and equipment around the
table. At the same time, the United States, again, as I understand it, was
not ready to change the small business set-aside. So I think that focus
was reflected in the decision of the provincial governments not to come
forward with some of their offers.
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